Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2007

State of Utah v. Jesus Partida: Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mark Shurtleff; attorney general; counsel for appellee.
Margaret P. Lindsay; counsel for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State of Utah v. Jesus Partida, No. 20070356 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/209

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellee
Case No. 20070356-CA

vs.
JESUS PARTIDA,
Defendant / Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT,
STATE OF UTAH, FROM THE JUDGMENT, SENTENCE AND COMMITMENT
OF THE HONORABLE STEVEN L. HANSEN, AFTER CONVICTION FOR
MULTIPLE FELONY SEX OFFENSES

MARK SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Counsel for Appellee
MARGARET P. LINDSAY (6766)
775 West Center Street
P.O. Box 1058
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660
Telephone: (801) 318-319f &-ED
JTAH APPELLATE COURTS
Counsel for Appellant MAR 0 3 2009

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

1

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

1

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

A.

Nature of the Case

2

B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition

2

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

4
11

ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Sentencing
Maddux to Consecutive Prison Terms

11

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT

14

ADDENDA
Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-201
Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-401

15

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Statutory Provisions
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201

11

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401

12

Cases Cited
State v. Fedorwicz, 2002 UT 67, 52 P.3d 1194
State v. Galh, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998)

1
12

State v. Mauchley, 2003 UT 10, 67 P.3d 477
State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454 (Utah App.1993)

2
1, 12

State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993)

12

State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296 (Utah App. 1989)

12

it

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20070356-CA

vs.
JESUS PARTIDA,
Defendant/Appellant

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(e).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sentencing Partida to consecutive prison

sentences? "A sentence will not be overturned on appeal unless the trial court has abused
its discretion, failed to consider all legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that
exceeds legally prescribed limits." State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 456 (Utah App. 1993).
Specifically, the trial court's decision to impose consecutive sentences is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Fedorwicz, 2002 UT 67, \ 63, 52 P.3d 1194. This issue was
preserved in arguments made at sentencing (R. 397: 2-4).
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CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
All relevant statutory provisions are set forth in the Addenda of the Appellant's
Brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
The Defendant, Jesus Partida, appeals from the judgment, sentence and
commitment of the Honorable Steven L. Hansen, Fourth District Court, after he was
convicted by a jury of multiple felony sex offenses.
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Jesus Partida was charged by criminal information filed on August 22, 2005 with
four counts of forcible sodomy, first degree felonies, and eleven counts of forcible sexual
abuse, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated §§ 76-5-403(2) and
76-5-404, respectively (R. 04-01). Partida waived his right to a preliminary hearing (R.
60-58).
Partida filed a Motion to Exclude Confession on September 12, 2006 on the
grounds that neither Partida's statements after his alleged confession, nor statements by
other people, corroborate his confession (R. 119-10). On October 5, 2006 an evidentiary
suppression hearing was held before Judge Hansen (R. 395). On October 10, 2006 Judge
Hansen denied Pallida's motion pursuant to the factors set forth in State v. Mauchley,
2003 UT 10, 67 P.3d 477 (R. 182-74).
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The trial court found the confession given by Partida to be trustworthy by a
preponderance of the evidence and based on the totality of the circumstances (R. 179,
177). The court found further: One, that there was no deception or trickery in forcing the
testimony from Partida, and that Partida voluntarily initiated the interview with police (R.
177). Two, that Partida was given his Miranda warnings and confessed of his own free
will (R. 177). Three, that Partida is in good physical and mental condition, that he speaks
English fluently and showed no signs of understanding Detective Eccles (R. 177). In
addition, he is mature, had some college education, and was praised during his employee
evaluations (R. 177). Four, Detective Eccles confirmed that all of the alleged victims
resided at the care center during Pallida's employment there, and that he was often
responsible for their care (R. 176). Five, that during his interviews, Partida was
consistent with his story and only deviated on a few minor detailsfrominterview to
interview (R. 176).
A jury trial was held on October 11-12, 2006 (R. 195-91). Partida was convicted
of all fifteen counts (R. 195-91).
On January 16, 2007 Partida was sentenced to five-years to life sentences on
counts 1-4, and to 1-15 year sentences on counts 5-15. The court ordered that counts 110 should be consecutive sentences, and counts 11-15 could be served concurrently (R.
346-43).
After trial, Partida filed first a motion to arrest then a motion for new trial, arguing
that insufficient independent evidence corroborating Pallida's confession was presented
by the State, and that the court should re-examine the motion to exclude confession (R.
3

303-288, 359-50). The trial court denied the motions (R. 340-338, 369-67). The motion
for new trial was denied on March 14, 2007 (R. 369-67).
On April 13, 2007 Partida filed a notice of appeal in Fourth District Court (R.
382).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
A. Testimony of BJ Eccles
BJ Eccles of the American Fork Police Department testified that he became
involved in this matter when he was told by Officer Doyle that Jesus Partida would be
coming in to the police department to disclose some information that had been disclosed
to a counselor or doctor (R. 394: 35, 36).
At approximately 9:00 a.m. on July 14, 2005 Partida came into the police
department with his wife, and his LDS bishop (R. 394: 36). Eccles spoke briefly with the
three of them before taking Partida into an interview room (R. 394: 36-37). He left
Partida alone in the interview room briefly while he put a blank videotape in a machine to
record the interview (R. 394: 37). Before the interview began, Eccles read Partida his
Miranda rights and had him sign a waiver form (State's Exhibit #1) (R. 394: 39-40).
During the interview, Partida disclosed that he had abused different women while
working at the Heritage Care Center in American Fork from 2003-2005 (R. 394: 44).
State's Exhibit #3 is the videotape from the interview on July 14, 2005. A transcript of
that interview was prepared (R. 404).
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First, he admitted to placing his finger inside the vagina of Alta Bench on two
separate occasions; and that on another occasion he attempted to have her perform oral
sex on him by taking his pants down and placing his penis on her mouth (R. 394: 44).
Second, Partida said that on two occasions he also touched the vagina of Margaret
Timmons (R. 394: 45). He worked as a CNA and this occurred while he was changing
her diaper (R. 394: 45).
Third, Partida admitted to sticking his fingers inside the vagina of Mabel Williams
while also changing her diaper (R. 394: 45-46). He also disclosed that on another
occasion he played with her clitoris while she was leaning up against the wall (R. 394:
46).
Four, Partida indicated that on one occasion he stuck his finger in Dorothy Veth's
vagina (R. 394: 46-47). The transcript of the videotape quotes Partida as saying
"Dorothy, I just did it once with her.... I tried to... in the process of cleaning, I stick my
finger in her vagina just once" (R. 404: 2).
Five, Partida told Eccles that he also placed his finger inside the vagina of Ruth
Miranda (R. 394: 47). Partida's exact words were that in the process of cleaning, he
"stick my finger in her vagina. But it wasn't like—you know—like bad or like—well, it
was bad. But it wasn't like to have sex" (R. 404: 2). Partida was asked by Eccles why he
did it and he replied, "Just out of—you know—sometimes you see just how their
reaction—or like a couple of times to try and stimulate" (R. 404: 2).
Six, while caring for Mary Crawford, Partida pulled his pants down and placed his
penis on her hand and had her hold it (R. 394: 47). Partida stated, "I didn't try to have

sex with them... [with] Crawford, I like guide her hand... since she always like—you
know—she had this thing she liked to grab, so I guide her hand to my—my penis" (R.
404: 2-3). He stated "There wasn't masturbation or any movement or any jiggling,
nothing" (R. 404: 3).
Seven, Partida admitted that on one occasion while caring for Lois Dalzen, he
touched her vagina (R. 394: 47-48, 404: 4). In addition, he fondled her breasts on two
occasions and attempted to have oral sex by placing his penis on her mouth (R. 394: 48,
404: 4-5). Partida stated, "I touch her... nipple and breast. Kind of like—it was in the
process of getting her ready, so I didn't do it for like—I didn't stay there" (R. 404: 3). He
did it "[t]o see how she react," and he admitted to getting "some urge" from it (R. 404: 34).
Eight, Partida identified Mary (Vestel) who was a resident of the south hall (R.
394: 48). He attempted to have her perform oral sex on him (R. 394: 48). "He undid his
pants, placed his penis in her mouth, in Mary's. During this time, Mr. Partida told me
that Mary must have thought that she was eating food and bit down on his penis, causing
it to bleed. Mr. Partida further explained to me that he then masturbated and ejaculated
on her mouth" (R. 394: 49; 404: 5).
Nine, Partida disclosed to Eccles that on another occasion "he pulled down his
pants, placed his penis on Lisa (Garrett's) mouth in an attempt to have her perform oral
sex on him. He told me that she was very out of it and she didn't know what was going
on. And there was no further action, or no other incident occurred after that, with—
pertaining to oral sex" (R. 394: 50). Eccles testified that Partida also indicated that, "he
6

really liked Lisa... [a]nd he would kiss her various times" (R. 394: 50). Partida also
described touching her vagina on one occasion and to having her hold his penis until he
could masturbate and ejaculate" (R. 394: 50). See also, R. 404: 7-8, 10. He ejaculated on
her nightgown (R. 404: 9).
Ten, Partida also admitted to pulling his pants down and placing his penis very
quickly into the mouth of Linda Howard (R. 394: 51; 404: 10-11). He didn't ejaculate
because he felt guilty (R. 404: 11).
Partida told Eccles that these patients "were very out of it, they had either
Alzheimer's or dementia of some sort or another, or long term cancer that they couldn't
just concentrate on him" (R. 394: 51). None of them were unaware of what was going on
(R. 394: 51). Eccles testified that Partida indicated he did these acts "for sexual
gratification," and because he was curious to see what their facial reactions would be (R.
394:51-52).
Eccles also had Partida fill out a witness statement (State's Exhibit #2) (R. 394:
52-54). On the form is written out the Miranda warnings, as well as an admonition that
it's a class B misdemeanor to provide a false statement to police (R. 394: 55). Eccles
then went into the videotape room and discovered that the machine was not recording (R.
394: 55-56). He grabbed another tape and plugged it into the machine and then repeated
the initial interview with Partida (R. 394: 56).
Eccles denied threatening or intimidating Partida during the interview (R. 394:
57). At the end of the interview, Eccles told Partida that if he wasn't told everything then
"we are going to be a lot meaner too" (R. 404: 12).
7

After the interview, Partida went home with his wife (R. 394: 61).
Eccles also interviewed Partida on August 2, 2005 (R. 394: 62). Partida was
dropped off at the police department by his wife (R. 394: 63). Eccles again gave Partida
the Miranda warnings and he again signed a written waiver (State's Exhibit #5) (R. 394:
63-64).
Eccles drove Partida to the Heritage Care Center (R. 394: 65). Inside the center
they went from "room to room and had him explain what occurred in those rooms" (R.
394: 66). This interview was also videotaped (R. 394: 66). State's Exhibit #4, which
has also been transcribed (R. 405), is the recording of that interview.1
The reason for the second interview was so Eccles could corroborate what he was
told during the first interview "and to make sure that these people were there, and where
these acts allegedly occurred" (R. 394: 69). In addition, Eccles tried to get as much
information about the rooms to corroborate Partida's statements because some of the
women had died (R. 394: 69). He was not able to interview any of the women because
eight of the ten were deceased by the time of the investigation, and the other two could
not be interviewed because of their mental conditions (R. 394: 70-71).
The tape of the interview begins in the middle of discussion while in Lois
Dawson's (Dalzen) room (R. 405: 16). Partida stated she was tall and big, and that he
tried to have oral sex with her while she was sitting down (R. 405: 17, 18). He also stated

1

It appears that the first part of the transcript of this interview also contains the July 14,
2005 interview. The new material begins at the very bottom of page 16.
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that he touched her breast another occasion, and touched her vagina while cleaning "to
see how she react" (R. 405: 18-19).
In Altha Bench's room (room 302), Partida stated he stuck his finger up to the first
knuckle into her vagina after her shower while he was putting a new brief on her and
cleaning her (R. 405: 20). He was wearing gloves (R. 405: 21). He stated that when she
had the room, the bed was in a different location (R. 405: 22). On another occasion he
tried to have oral sex with her while she was sitting on the toilet (R. 405: 23). He pulled
down his scrubs and pulled his penis out of his underwear, and then tried to stick his
penis in her mouth but "couldn't reach" (R. 405: 24). He stated he "didn't touch her with
my penis" (R. 405:24).
In Margaret Timmons' room, everything was arranged the same way (R. 405: 2526). While he was cleaning her one morning, he stuck hisfingerin her vagina while she
was laying in bed (R. 405: 26-27). He never tried to perform oral sex on her (R. 405: 28).
In Bena Howard's room, the furniture had been rearranged because it was no
longer her room (R. 405: 29). Partida stated that she was "abused once" (R. 405: 30). He
pulled his scrubs down and touched her mouth with his penis (R. 405: 30-31).
In Mabel Williams' room, Partida indicated that on one occasion he was cleaning
her after a bowel movement and stuck hisfingerin her vagina up to the first knuckle (R.
405: 33-34). It happened once (R. 405: 34).
In "Mary's" room, Partida recalled that she lived in the room approximately
December of 2003 (R. 405: 35). She was in a wheelchair and the door open, and a

curtain was half closed (R. 405: 36-37). He tried to perform oral sex on her—he touched
her lips with his penis (R. 405: 37-38). It happened once (R. 405: 38).
In Lisa Garrett's room, Partida recalled she was in bed and he tried to perform oral
sex on her (R. 405: 40, 41-43). The door was open, and the curtain was pulled over (R.
405: 40). It happened on two separate occasions (R. 405: 41). He ejaculated pulling out
(R. 405: 43-45).
In Dorothy Veth's room, Partida testified that at the time the bed was different but
in the same location (R. 405: 46). He stated that as he was wiping and cleaning her with
his gloves on, he stuck his fmger in her vagina (R. 405: 46). She asked what he was
doing, and he replied that he was "just cleaning" (R. 405: 47). It happened one time (R.
405: 47). The curtain was pulled but the door was open (R. 405: 47).
In Ruth Miranda's room, Partida disclosed that he tried to get her to hold his penis
(R. 405: 49-50).
Afterwards, Eccles and Partida returned to the police station and watched the
videotape from the care center (R. 405: 71). Eccles testified that Partida indicated that
the statements he made at the care center were accurate (R. 405: 71).
Eccles testified that he became aware the previous week, during an evidentiary
hearing, that Partida had recanted his confessions (R. 405: 72).
B. Testimony of Steven Fraser
Steven Fraser testified that he is the administrator at the Heritage Care Center (R.
394: 120). He testified that Partida began working at the center as a CNA the end of
June, 2003 (R. 394: 121, 122), and he ceased his employment there to take another job in
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February-March of 2005 (R. 394: 123). Fraser testified that Partida was "well mannered,
clean cut, professional, I would have characterized him as a good CNA" (R. 394: 124).
The defense stipulated that the resident history lists and face sheets, which were
introduced into evidence "indicate the same room numbers that we saw on [the] videos,
that these residents were in those rooms at that time" (R. 394: 126). The parties also
stipulated that each of the women suffered from some degree of Alzheimer's or dementia
or some other type of mentally debilitating disorder (R. 394: 138).
Fraser testified that it was very common for a CNA to be alone with a
patient/resident (R. 394: 137). A CNA's job includes cleaning and changing diapers (R.
394: 138-39). It would not be inappropriate for a CNA to touch the private parts of a
resident for cleaning purposes (R. 394: 139). But touching with a different intent would
be very inappropriate (R. 394: 139).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Partida to consecutive prison
terms given all the mitigating factors that were present and argued to the court.

ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In Sentencing Partida to
Consecutive Prison Terms.
Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-201(2) provides: "Within the limits prescribed by

this chapter, a court may sentence a person convicted of an offense to any one of the

following sentences or combination of them: (a) to pay a fine; (b) to removal or
disqualification from public or private office; (c) to probation unless otherwise
specifically provided by law; (d) to imprisonment...." This Court will not reverse a
sentencing decision of a trial court unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion, the trial
court failed to consider all legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that exceeds
legally prescribed limits." State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 456 (Utah App. 1993).
Partida asserts that the trial court erred in sentencing him to consecutive prison
terms on counts 1-10. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) provides that the determination of
concurrent or consecutive sentences shall take into account "the gravity and
circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and
rehabilitative needs of the defendant" (emphasis added). The language of the statute is
mandatory; all factors listed must be taken into account by the trial court in determining
the sentence. Concurrent sentences are favored over consecutive ones. State v. Galli,
967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998); State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1301 (Utah 1993). See
also State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296, 1300 (Utah App. 1989) ("The entire sentencing
process is a search for truth and an evaluation of alternatives").
Partida asserts that under the facts of this case, the trial court abused its discretion
in sentencing him to consecutive prison terms on counts 1-10. While there is no statutory
obligation in this case that the trial court weigh the mitigating and the aggravating factors
in imposing sentence, Partida asserts that an examination of these factors is relevant to a
consideration of the factors required by statute in the imposition of consecutive
sentences, as well as looking at the ends of justice and public interest.
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In this case the factors in aggravation are: One, the victims were vulnerable.
Two, there were multiple victims. Three, Partida's attitude is not conducive to probation.
Four, that these were sex offenses and he qualifies as a high risk offender. Five, that
Partida was in a position of authority (PSI at Form 4). On the other hand, the only
mitigating factor listed was that Partida had extended periods of arrest-free street time
(id.).
Partida not only has extended periods of arrest-free time, these offenses are his
only criminal convictions (PSI at 6). He scored 1 point on the Sex Offender Criminal
History Assessment (PSI at Form 2). Moreover, at the time of sentencing he had served
522 days (PSI at Form 4). Furthermore, he has no history of gang involvement or
substance abuse issues (PSI at 2, 6).
In addition, Partida asserts that there are several mitigating facts in this matter
which were not included: One, that he assisted law enforcement in the resolution of these
crimes. He was the one who voluntarily came forward. His confessions were the only
evidence of any wrong doing here.
Two, Partida is educated and has exceptionally good employment. At trial, the
administrator of the care center testified that he had been a very good employee. In
addition, he has worked as a car salesman and spent over three years total working for
C.R. Cabinets in Lindon (PSI at 3).
Three, all offenses were basicallyfroma single criminal episode (PSI at Form 2,
4).

n

Partida asserts that all of these mitigating circumstances argue in favor of nonconsecutive sentences. The psychological evaluation recommended that he represents a
high risk to sexually offend in the future, and that he should not be released into the
community until he has made "remarkable gains in a sex offender treatment program"
(Evaluation attached to PSI at 7). Partida did not argue against prison at sentencing.
Instead, he asserts that the trial court's only abuse of discretion was in ordering that
counts 1-10 should be served consecutively. Concurrent sentences are favored over
consecutive ones; and Partida asserts that this should particularly be the case here, where
the only evidence of any wrongdoing came from his own confessions. There was no
other independent evidence. Accordingly, he maintains that the trial court abused its
discretion in sentencing him to consecutive prison terms.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Partida asks that this Court vacate his sentence and remand to the trial court for a
new sentencing.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of March, 2009.

Margaret r. Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant
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Westlaw
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-3-201

Page 1

c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code
*B Chapter 3. Punishments
*ffl Part 2. Sentencing
-• § 76-3-201. Definitions—Sentences or combination of sentences allowed—Civil penalties—Hearing
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any other criminal conduct for
which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the
criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages, which a person could recover
against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings and medical expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a victim, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as further defined in Title 77, Chapter 38a,
Crime Victims Restitution Act.
(e)(i) "Victim" means any person who the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities.
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person convicted of an offense to any one of
the following sentences or combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West Nn riaim t* n ™ TTC n—.

(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or
(f) to death.
(3)(a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to:
(i) forfeit property;
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
(iii) suspend or cancel a license;
(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
(vi) impose any other civil penalty.
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
(4)(a) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any
other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to the victims, or for conduct
for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement.
(b) In determining whether restitution is appropnate, the court shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided
in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act.
(5)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall order the defendant to pay restitution of
governmental transportation expenses if the defendant was:
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another within the state at governmental expense to
resolve pending criminal charges;
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and
(iii) convicted of a crime.
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if any of the
following apply:
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent failure to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order.
(c)(i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (5)(a)(i) shall be calculated according
to the following schedule:

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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Page 3

(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported,
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported, and
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported
(n) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to each defendant transported regardless of the
number of defendants actually transported m a single trip
(d) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending
criminal charges and is convicted of criminal activity m the county to which he has been returned, the court may,
in addition to any other sentence it may impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended by
any governmental entity for the extradition
(6)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, and unless otherwise ordered by the court pursuant to
Subsection (6)(c), the defendant shall pay restitution to the county for the cost of mcarceration in the county correctional facility before and after sentencmg if
(I) the defendant is convicted of criminal activity that results in incarceration in the county correctional facility,
and
(n)(A) the defendant is not a state prisoner housed m a county correctional facility through a contract with the
Department of Corrections, or
(B) the reimbursement does not duplicate the reimbursement provided under Section 64-13e-104 if the defendant is a state probationary inmate, as defmed m Section 64-13e-102, or a state parole inmate, as defmed in
Section 64-13e-102
(b)(i) The costs of mcarceration under Subsection (6)(a) are the amount determined by the county correctional facility, but may not exceed the daily inmate mcarceration costs and medical and transportation costs for the county
correctional facility
(n) The costs of mcarceration under Subsection (6)(a) do not include expenses incurred by the county correctional facility m providing reasonable accommodation for an inmate qualifying as an individual with a disability
as defmed and covered by the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U S C 12101 through 12213,
including medical and mental health treatment for the inmate's disability
(c) In determining whether to order that the restitution required under this Subsection (6) be reduced or that the
defendant be exempted from the restitution, the court shall consider the criteria under Subsections 77-38a-302
(5)(c)(i) through (IV) and shall enter the reason for its order on the record
(d) If on appeal the defendant is found not guilty of the criminal activity under Subsection (6)(a)(i) and that finding is fmal as defmed m Section 76-1-304, the county shall reimburse the defendant for restitution the defendant
paid for costs of mcarceration under Subsection (6)(a)
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CREDIT(S)
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-201; Laws 1979, c. 69, § 1; Laws 1981, c. 59, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 85, § 1; Laws 1983, c.
88, § 3 ; Laws 1984, c. 18, § l;Laws 1986, c. 156, § l;Laws 1987, c. 107, § LLaws 1990. c. 81, § 1: Laws 1992.
c. 142. § 1; Laws 1993. c. 17. § 1; Laws 1994. c. 13. § 19; Laws 1995. c. 111. S 1. eff. Mav 1. 1995; Laws
1995.C. 117. § l.eff. Mav 1. 1995; Laws 1995. c. 301. § 1. eff. Mav 1. 1995; Laws 1995. c. 337. g l.eff. May 1.
1995; Laws 1995. 1st Sp.Sess.. c. 10. § 1. eff. Apnl 29. 1996; Laws 1996. c. 40. § 1. eff. April 29. 1996; Laws
1996. c. 79. g 98. eff. Apnl 29. 1996; Laws 1996. c. 241. §§ 2. 3. eff. Apnl 29. 1996; Laws 1998. c. 149. § l.eff.
Mav 4. 1998; Laws 1999. c. 270. § 15. eff. Mav 3. 1999; Laws 2001. c. 209. § 1. eff. Apnl 30. 2001: Laws 2002.
c. 35. § 4. eff. Mav 6. 2002: Laws 2003. c. 280. $ 1. eff. Mav 5. 2003: Laws 2006. c. 208. § 1. eff. Mav 1. 2006:
Laws 2007. c. 154. $ 1. eff. Apnl 30. 2007: Laws 2007. c. 339. $ 3. eff. Apnl 30. 2007; Laws 2007. c. 353. § 9.
eff. Apnl 30. 2007; Laws 2008. c. 151. § 1. eff. Mav 5. 2008.
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 76 Utah Criminal Code
*M Chapter 3 Punishments
*li Part 4 Limitations and Special Provisions on Sentences
•4" § 76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences—Limitations—Definition
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one felony offense, whether to
impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses The court shall state on the record and shall mdicate in
the order of judgment and commitment
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to each other, and
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively with any other sentences the defendant is already serving
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of
the defendant
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if the later offense is committed while
the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, unless the court fmds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing
would be mappropnate
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall request clarification from the court Upon receipt of the request, the
court shall enter a clarified order of commitment statmg whether the sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a smgle criminal episode as defmed in
Section 76-1-401
(6)(a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all sentences imposed may not exceed 30
years imprisonment, except as provided under Subsection (6)(b)
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if
(1) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death penalty or a maximum sentence of life
imprisonment, or
(n) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which occurs after his initial sentence
or sentences are imposed
(7) The limitation m Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant
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(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense;
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were committed prior to imposition of the
defendant's initial sentence; or
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to the present offense did not occur after his initial
sentencing by any other court.
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of consecutive sentences and the manner
in which they shall be served, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed for a single term that consists of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows:
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the maximum sentence is considered to be 30
years; and
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any, constitutes the aggregate of the
validly imposed minimum terms.
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that provides the longer remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served.
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of individual consecutive sentences that may
be imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually
served under the commitments.
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases.
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not been terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless
of where the person is located.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-401; Laws 1974, c. 32, §7; Laws 1989, c. 181, § 1; Laws 1994. c. 13. §21: Laws 1995.
c. 139. § l.eff. May 1. 1995; Laws 1997. c. 283. § 1. eff. May 5. 1997. Laws 1999. c. 275. $ 1. eff. May 3. 1999;
Laws 2002. c. 129. S 1. eff. July 1. 2002.
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